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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the potential impact of the recently enacted forest protection laws on the number 
of forest fires in Argentina. The forest protection laws (at a federal and provincial level) restricts the 
use of forestry land in several ways, and limit the expansion of the agricultural frontier. This 
restriction can make forest arson potentially profitable to clear land and to expand the agricultural 
frontier circumventing the laws. We present a conceptual model based in the economic theory of crime 
to analyze forest arson decisions, and to predict individual behavior. Using panel data from 2002 to 
2014 at a provincial level we present empirical evidence of systematic effects in the occurrence of 
forest fire as a function of the new regulation and its sequential implementation. Fixed effects and 
difference-in-differences estimates show that the number of fires increased transitory some 100% -
200% in the main crop producer provinces during the law implementation process (2009-2011). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, policies related to environmental protection became increasingly prominent in 
Argentina, and the number of measures regulating the use of natural resources has increased. 
In year 2007 the “Minimum Standards for Environmental Protection of Native Forest” Act 
(henceforth, NF Act) established restrictions to the change in forestland use. After the passing 
of this federal law the argentine provinces (who are the regulatory authority on natural 
resources) enforced the legislation, designing a Native Forest Territorial Planning Map 
(NFTP). The time lapse between the beginning of the federal law regulation (2009) and the 
implementation of NFTP by provinces were different among provinces, but it took fa more 
than the 12 months stated originally by the federal law.  
During this period, the provincial regulators were influenced by different interest groups 
which tried to affect forest land categorization. Also, during the time each province took to set 
NFTP permits for legal clear-cutting were suspended. However, this restriction was in some 
way broken by different illegal deforestation actions. Without legal permits for clearing and 
use the land in productive activities, there are two possible alternatives for a land owner: a) 
illegal forest clearance, b) to intentionally cause a fire and simulate it happened accidentally. 
This paper focuses on the second alternative: forest arson economically motivated.  
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In recent years, with high relative prices for agricultural production, people may perceive a 
high opportunity cost for preserving forests in their natural state and therefore they may favor 
the expansion of agricultural frontier (Zak et al, 2008, Viglizzo et al 2011). Even though there 
is an economic compensation established by law for forest conservation, the amount of money 
is relatively low, and landowners generally do not apply for it. On the other hand, the 
transaction costs associated to legally shifting from native forest conservation land use to an 
agricultural use are extremely high and this encourages illegal deforestation.  
We analyze in this paper the change that the NF Act arose in the structure of economic 
incentives and evaluate the potential impact of this regulation on intentional forest fires. The 
main question to address is whether there is an increase in the number of forest fires due to 
the implementation of the native forest conservation law. 
The NF Act was implemented sequentially, first at national level through a regulatory decree 
and afterwards at a provincial level through local laws. Despite the new regulations and 
controls there can be important incentives to generate intentional fires to avoid legal 
restrictions. A forest arson can be a mean to excluding the site from the scope of the 
regulations. The approach developed by Gary Becker (1968) is used as conceptual framework 
to analyze the economic incentives for fire forest arson. 
We organized the paper as follows: first, we present a description of the regulatory and 
economic environment regarding native forest and agricultural production in Argentina. 
Section III, present a literature review related to forest arson and economic incentives. Section 
IV develops a conceptual model to capture the interplay between regulation and economic 
incentives to commit illegal activities. The next section describes the data and Section VI 
presents the empirical specification and the econometric techniques employed.  Section VI 
reports the empirical results. Section VII concludes. 
II. Institutions and Economic Incentives 
In Argentina native forests are mainly placed on lands which have clearly defined property 
rights. Therefore, the restrictions over decisions on the use of resources have direct economic 
consequences on their owners. The main hypothesis in this study is that there are economic 
incentives which can motivate intentional forest fires crime if landowners perceive a high 
opportunity cost in conserving the forest in a legal manner. In the following section, we 
describe the transition towards greater restrictions in the use of forest lands after the NF Act 
enforcement at national and local level.  
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A. Institutions: Native Forest Legal Framework 
National NF Act’s main objective is to establish minimum standards for forestry 
environmental protection. It sets up minimum criteria for forest land categorization and it 
command the implementation through Native Forest Territorial Planning (NFTP) in the 
different provinces. Through this process the existing forest area was classified in three 
conservation categories (red, yellow and green). The two greater conservation categories (red 
and yellow) limit land use and comprise 70% to 90% of the forest area in the argentine 
provinces.  Below, we describe the timing of the regulations and we characterize each stage 
and their main consequences. 
The Native Forest National Act 
In November 2007, the Congress passed the Native Forest National Act, and later, in 2009, 
the Regulatory Decree for this law was enacted.  It took several years for most of the 
provinces to comply with NFTP process. During those years, illegal activities which could 
affect forest conservation should be, according to the law, strictly controlled.  
Figure 1 shows the timing of the regulatory process. We identify a sequence of three stages 
from 2002 to 2014: a) years before the federal law (stage I), b) transition period (stage II), and 
c) years after the NFTP (stage III). 
The NF Act banned the deforestation, under any circumstance, of native forests until 
provincial NFTP enactment. We call this intermediate phase, stage II. If as from this 
provincial categorization a specific land site falls within the red or yellow category, legal 
deforesting to undertake any productive land use becomes banned in stage III. Consequently, 
we could expect an eventual increase in illegal deforestation during the stage II if individuals 
perceive potential economic gains changing the land categorization. Landowners with native 
forest areas in their lands, considering the deforestation ban and the uncertainty about the 
category in which the land will be classified, may consider profitable to deforest by 
simulating an accidental fire to avoid a potential economic restriction in future land use.  
It is important to note that the transition time window may vary according to each province, 
depending on the year that each province completed the NFTP. By the end of 2010, almost 
70% of the provinces had fulfilled the NFTP. The rest of the provinces enacted the provincial 
law between 2011 and 2014. 
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Figure 1. Timing of Regulations 
 
Source: Authors elaboration 
 
 B. Economic Incentives: Changes in Agricultural Profitability 
During the initial years of the new regulation Argentina underwent an expansive phase of its 
agricultural frontier. In part due to important technological changes, but mostly due to 
favorable international agricultural prices. Figure 2 shows the evolution of prices for the four 
main exporting crops. 
A recent study on agricultural frontier expansion in Argentina and its impact on environment 
(Viglizzo et al, 2011), explains how this expansion affected natural areas, highlighting that 
during 2000-2005 the most active advance areas were set in the central and northeastern 
region of the country where we can find an important concentration of native forest. 
Favorable agricultural prices and low compensation for conserving forests are factors added 
to weak law enforcement and control, and may motivate illegal deforestation as a rational 
decision considering the expected benefits. 
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Figure 2. Grain Prices in Argentina (current dollars / ton). 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from Dirección de Información Agrícola y Forestal – Ministry 
of Agriculture, Argentina. 
 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW: FOREST FIRES AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 
The first studies which look for evidence on the correlation between intentionally set fires and 
economic variables were carried out by the insurance industry. In this context, Hershbarger 
and Miller (1978) made a key contribution with their study “The Impact of Economic 
Conditions on the Incidence of Arson”. The authors analyzed the relationship between a 
group of economic indicators and losses due to intentionally set fires. They found a 
statistically significant relationship to explain some of the losses.  
Some recent studies extended the analysis, specifically on intentionally set forest fires. 
Initially, there were studies that modelled the occurrence of forest fires according to the kind 
of land use, incorporating economic variables to evaluate if the fires were motivated by 
profits (Martinez, Chuvieco and Martin, 2004; Prestemon and Butry, 2005; Arima et al, 
2007). 
Michetti and Pinar (2003) use panel data econometric techniques to study causes of forest fire 
frequency and intensity in Italy.  The authors define three geographical areas to control 
specific characteristics and they confirm differences among fire patterns in different regions. 
For example, in the south of Italy, the existence of illegal organizations correlates 
significantly with the number of forest fires.  
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In recent years, there have been several studies on economic incentives related to intentionally 
set fires in native forests. But, in general, emphasis was focused on finding a variable which 
would confirm the existence of intention in the setting of the fire and not only in economic 
incentives (Arima et al, 2007; Dogandjieva, 2008; Mothershead, 2012). 
The conceptual approach presented in this paper follows the analysis proposed by 
Dogandjieva (2008). This author uses an economic model of criminal behavior to examine the 
relationship between land, grains, wood price and native forest fires incidence in the south of 
Europe. This author evaluated fire intentionality from a specific variable related to law 
enforcement. The author finds evidence of a relationship between economic incentives and 
forest fires, but he could not confirm that the fires had been intentional as from the variable 
used. 
In Latin America Arima et al (2007), where they estimate the probability of agricultural and 
forest fire in the Amazonia, Brazil. The main conclusions of this study were first, that the 
increase in meat and soybean prices, together with roads paving, had a positive impact on 
forest fire ocurrence; second, that the creation of protected areas in some way reverted the 
impact, therefore reducing the possibility of fires to occur.  
Finally, there are some studies examining the negative effects generated by policies. For 
example, inappropriate environmental control policies which lead to misrepresentation in 
individual incentives structure and impact on forest fire incidence. Pazienza y Beraldo (2004) 
analyzed the impact of a forest law on forest fires frequency variation in the south of Italy. 
They concluded that environment policies related to forest fire emergency management 
motivated unemployed people to carry out native forest intentional burning. This happened 
because they expected to be employed as firemen to fight fire (as it is so established by law). 
 
IV. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. The Economics of Crime 
The model developed by Gary Becker (1968) becomes the standard conceptual framework to 
analyze criminal behavior in economics. According to Becker’s model, rational choice results 
from maximizing individual utility and considers the criminal as a rational profit-maximizing 
individual who will only commit a crime (set off a fire) if the expected marginal utility is 
greater than zero. For criminal activities the agent faces uncertainty about the net profit 
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derived from his actions, therefore the individual maximizes an expected utility function. The 
model assumes that an individual commits a crime only if its expected net benefits exceeds 
the benefit from using his time and other resources in an alternative activity. Formally, the 
expected utility of committing a crime for an individual is expressed as follows: 
     (1) 
Where yj represents the income obtained from the crime, pj represents the probability of being 
caught and going to prison, fj represents the punishment (equivalent in monetary terms) in 
case he is caught.  
By taking partial derivatives with respect to the exogenous variables pj and fj we can predict 
individual behavior. Increasing the probability of being caught will diminish marginally the 
benefit and consequently, incentives for committing the crime will also be reduced. The 
analysis can be performed to a punishment increase: 
       (2) 
       (3) 
This way we can also expect that an increase in illegal activity income will also increase the 
expected utility of crime making it more attractive.  
From this framework it is possible to propose a crime supply equation (Oj) that is function of 
the exogenous variables: probability of being caught, punishment and income derived from 
the illegal activity. 
         (4) 
The variable uj represents all the other factors which can influence an individual’s decision to 
commit a crime. Changes in the exogenous variables affect expected benefit of committing a 
crime and the choice between legal and illegal activities. Variables fj and pj may be grouped 
in only one variable fpj, which represents probability of being arrested as well as the 
punishment for committing the crime for individual j.  
In our case, the income variable (y) is the potential profit from forest arson and it depends on 
several factors: land prices, the price of agricultural products, etc. An individual will set a 
forest fire to deforest if the expected benefit of this action is positive and greater than the 
benefit of conserving the natural forest o changing land use in a legal way.   
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This model allows us to explain general behavior during stages I and III (pre, and post NF 
Act). However, for the transition stage II it is necessary to consider the potential 
consequences of the forest arson over the future site categorization. In stage II, it must be 
considered that crime can also be motivated by future potential profits, since fire can increase 
the probability for the land to be excluded from extreme regulations in the future. Stage II is 
different from the others because it must be considered that the individual, through the forest 
arson, can influence NFTP process and making the lands not to be categorized as a yellow or 
red area. Therefore, incentives change for individuals according to the stage and the area 
where the land is. In the next section, we will describe the decision process for a landowner in 
each stage following the Becker’s model and incorporating benefits derived from the potential 
influencing on regulations. 
B. Individual Decision Process 
Individuals must choose whether to: a) set a forest on fire intentionally (simulating an 
accident or natural causes) to modify forest land use and turn it into agricultural land b) 
request for permission to do it legally, or c) conserve NF. According to the defined stages, we 
present the different cases where a forest arson is optimal for a representative agent. 
STAGE I: the individual compares benefits for replacing NF legally (using a deforesting 
permit)1 or illegally (arson) by an economic activity (agriculture or livestock farming) as 
opposed to conserving the forest.  
To cause an intentional fire the following condition must hold:  
  (5) 
Where Raj is the farm income obtained if forest land is replaced by agricultural land, CLj is the 
legal cost of land use change and RFj is the forest income obtained from conserving the forest. 
The first part of the condition (5) represents the expected benefit of illegal forest area 
replacement, the second part represents the expected benefit of legally changing land use, and 
the last part specifies NF conservation benefit. The other variables maintain the definition 
corresponding to the model presented in the above section.  
STAGE II: the agent evaluates the expected benefit of intentionally setting fire to NF to 
influence NF categorization, trying to change the actual cover of the land to leave the area out 
of the future process of NFTP.  
                                                          
1 During this period there is no legal categorization for forest land according to conservation degree.  
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In this phase before NFTP, we consider not only the actual benefits and costs of committing a 
crime, but also the future potential income in case the land is successfully excluded from 
NFTP.  
To decide to replace NF by an agricultural activity, the forgone income of agricultural land 
must be higher than the discounted income of forest land. 
      (6) 
This condition compares the present profits (stage II) plus the discounted profits from periods 
after NFTP (where is the discount factor and r is the discount rate). To simplify, we assume 
that the income and the discount factor are constant over time, therefore income flows can be 
expressed as a perpetuity and condition (6) is: 
             (7) 
During this stage the landowner is obliged to conserve NF in their original natural state, until 
the province enacts the NFTP. In other words, land use for agricultural production is not a 
legal alternative.  
The forest arson is an economic alternative if the following condition is met2:  
 (8) 
 
Where q represents the subjective probability assigned for the area to be classified as green 
category according to NFTP, 1-q is the probability for land to be categorized as yellow or red. 
The q’ represents the probability for converting forest land into agricultural land during stage 
II after a forest arson3, and so excluding the land from NFTP process.  And, 1-q represents the 
probability for the land to be categorized as yellow or red despite land use change (in this case 
the individual behavior does not influence the regulation).  
The bigger the difference between the probability of excluding the land from regulation, 
relative to the probability of getting green category according to regulations, ( = q’- q), the 
more incentives the individual will have to commit the crime during the transition phase.  
                                                          
2 See an illustration of the sequential decision process in the Appendix.  
3 It is assumed that q’ is independent of the chance of being caught (p). That is to say, being caught committing 
arson does not affect land categorization probability.  
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Therefore, to obtain a net profit from committing the crime, the probability to “influence” the 
NFTP and succeed in turning forest land into agricultural land, must be higher than the 
probability of obtaining category III according to NF Act (q’j >qj). Thus, in this stage, crime is 
also motivated by the possibility of modifying endogenously the regulations to realize 
benefits in the future.  
STAGE III: This stage is like stage I, with the only difference that land categorization is 
already decided, and landowners have the right to apply for a payment for conserving the NF 
according to the law. 
Once the process is finished, the category designated to the specific area determines the 
potential land use. In this phase, individuals analyze costs and benefits associated to the 
category assigned to the land, as well as the probability of being caught if he commits forest 
arson. Two scenarios are possible here:  
a) red or yellow categorization, which implies NF conservation and restrictions in land use:  
     (9) 
b) green categorization, under which permission for changing land use of NF into 
agricultural use can be asked for. 
 (10) 
 
Finally, considering these different economic conditions we propose a supply function of 
forest fires for each stage defined as a continuous function which arises from adding 
individual decisions. With this conceptual framework derived from Becker’s basic model and 
following the conceptual proposition presented by Dogandjieva (2008), the forest fire supply 
may be defined as follows: 
         (11) 
Where represents the dependent variable number of forest fires, yj represents income, fpj 
represents costs and contains other components which can explain natural fires and 
intentionally set forest fires.  
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V. DATA AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS  
The dependent variable of interest is the number of forest fires observed in province i in year 
t4 and we consider that is the relevant variable for modelling the representative agent 
behavior. An alternative variable can be the area affected by fires, but it does not only depend 
on an individual decision, but also on different natural factors which cannot be controlled by 
the agent that starts the forest fire (Dogandjieva, 2008; Michetti and Pinar, 2013). 
Below, we present a descriptive analysis of the number of forest fires in Argentina in the 225 
provinces included in the study. This variable is expressed in number of fires by province x 
100.000 ha-1 of forest land in from year 2002 to year 20146. 
Figures 3 and 4, show a slightly decreasing trend in the total number of forest fires between 
2002 and 2014.  
The data show that during stages II and III the total number of fires decreased on average 
from 3.8 in 2009 to 2.2 in 2014. Most part of the total fires are explained by “unknown 
causes” and “intentional causes”, and a relative small number of fires are due to natural 
causes or negligence. It can be noted that the “negligence” cause for fires represented on 
average 27% until 2009, decreasing to 8% in 2014.  
Even though it is complex to identify the real causes of this kind of events and the origin of 
changes, the decrease in the number of negligent fires is consistent with the information 
provided by the Federal System of Fire Management, which has been in force for more than 
10 years7. 
The high percentage of fires due to unknown causes suggest that it is complex to identify the 
causes of this kind of events. This lack of information is part of the motivation for this study, 
since we suspect that unknown reasons can include disguised intentionally caused fires. 
Therefore, we use the total number of forest fires irrespective of their specific reported causes 
as dependent variable of interest.  
                                                          
4 Data source on forest fires is from the Argentina Forest Department. According to the definition a forest fire is 
every fire which spreads out of control over an area which was not supposed to burn; this area includes four 
types of vegetation: native forests, cultivated forests, pasture forests and shrub forests. 
5 The Federal District and Buenos Aires province were not included in the analysis. Buenos Aires was not 
included since NFTP has not been finished and NF area in this province is too small.  
6 The total area of forest land per province is based in estimates for year 2001. Data on the existing area between 
1998 and 2001 is available from the first inventory on Natural Forests in Argentina. There is no available and 
updated information for the following years.  
7 One of the goals of this system is to make people aware of the impact of fire use, trying to induce a change in 
harmful actions for the environment.    
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Figure 3. Annual number of fires per 100,000ha of forest land in 22 provinces of 
Argentina. Years 2002-2014. 
 
Source: authors own elaboration from the Forest Fires statistics published by the Secretariat of 
Environment and Development of Argentina. 
 
Figure 4. Causes of forest fires in Argentina 2002-2014. 
 
Source: authors own elaboration from the Forest Fires statistics published by the Secretariat of 
Environment and Development of Argentina. 
 
In the original database it is possible to identify the forest fires occurred within National 
Parks. The identification of fires which occurred within National Parks allows us, first, to 
exclude these fires from the data used for the econometric estimations. Second, we were able 
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to use this National Parks forest fire information to generate a control group suitable to be 
compared with other forest lands where economic incentives are relevant8.  
As a descriptive result, Figure 5 show that there is approximately 1 fire a year for every 
100.000 ha. in National Parks lands compared to 4 fires a year for every 100.000 ha in the rest 
of forest lands. This can be taken as partial evidence that human activity and economic 
incentives have a significant impact on the number of fires which take place in forest areas. 
Figure 5. Forest Fires Inside and Outside National Parks 
 
Source: authors own elaboration from the Forest Fires statistics published by the Secretariat of 
Environment and Development of Argentina. 
. 
 
Table 1 presents the average number of forest fires by stage of implementation of the NF Act 
and the result of a simple F test for difference in means. 
Table 1. Average number of Forest Fires per Stage 
    Nº of forest fires x 100.000 ha-1 
Stage I  t=1 4,58 
Stage II t=2 2,29 
Stage III t=3 2,85 
  F statistic  14,27 
  p-value  0 
                                                          
8 It is probable that in this kind of lands there would not be economic incentives related to intentional fires since 
its productive use is almost forbidden even in the case of accidental deforestation.  
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Simple comparison of the average number of fires suggests a decrease in the number of fires 
after NF Act implementation. The F test result rejects the null hypothesis and we can assume 
that at least one of the means is different. Therefore, according to this non-conditional 
evidence, the average number of fires seems to decrease after the NF Act enforcement.  The 
following section presents the econometric estimations where different results are obtained.  
 
I. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION   
A. Model and variables 
The forest fires function (FF) to be estimated is: 
   (12) 
Where FFit is the dependent variable that represents forest fires, measured as the number of 
forest fires per 100.000 ha-1 of native forest in province i, in year t. We intend to capture the 
potential impact of the institutional change introduced by the law on the number of intentional 
forest fires. Our explanatory variable of interest is the variable NFAct that assumes value of 1 
if the NF Act is in force. To estimate differential impacts, depending on the transitional time 
window, we incorporated binary variables which identify stages II and III defined in the 
section on institutions.  
We include a set of additional variables to control for economic and weather conditions that 
can affect the occurrence of forest fires other than the NF Act. To identify the relevant control 
variables, we follow the existing literature that analyzes economic incentives and forest fires 
in several regions and countries9. In general proxy variables accounting for economic 
incentives and weather conditions may differ and they must be adapted to data availability. 
We use the following set of control variables10: 
a) Economic incentives variables selected to explain the potential income that would be 
obtained from intentional fires: 
Index of crop prices (Prices) which consider the evolution of prices of the four main 
agricultural crops in Argentina (wheat, corn, soybeans and sunflower). 
                                                          
9 In chart A2 of the appendix we present the variables generally used in literature and the expected signs 
according to the correlation to forest fire dependent variable compiled by Michetti and Pinar (2003) 
10 For further details on variables and sources see the appendix.  
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Cattle stock (Stock), represents beef cattle stock measured in heads.  
Unemployment rate (UE) as a proxy to capture the relationship between insufficient 
economic opportunities, lower income and greater chances to undertake illegal 
activities which have an impact on natural resources (forest fires). 
Geographical Domestic Product growth rate (GDPgr), to control for provincial 
business cycles. 
LE (law enforcement) represents the potential cost of committing crime. Two proxies 
for law enforcement were included, the number of prosecuted and the number of 
convicts for crimes by province. 
b) Weather variables to control for natural causes: 
Rainfall (Precip), measured in mm/year per province 
Temperature (Temp), two measures of temperature where considered. First, the 
maximum temperature observed in year t in each province (TempMax) and, second, 
the number of days in a year with temperature over 80°F in each province (Temp80).  
The econometric specification for equation (12) is:  
  (13)11  
This specification represents a standard panel where the dependent variable number of forest 
fires (FF) for province i =1, ..., N in year t = 1, ..., T is a function of the institutional variable 
NFAct, a set of economic controls at the provincial level (xijt), a set of weather controls at the 
provincial level (wkit), and a specific effect per province i. The term it is a random error 
assumed to be independently and identically distributed. We control the specific effects using 
the panel data fixed effects (FE) estimator.  
The coefficient associated to the binary variable NFAct intend to capture the effect on forest 
fires of the stage II in the time window of the law implementation. Specifically, it assumes 
value equal one in years were the National Act suspended deforestation of native forests until 
provincial NFTP enactment. We assume that the institutional variable NFAct, is strictly 
exogenous.  
 
                                                          
11 J= regulatory decree (2009). 
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B. Results 
We estimate different models which differ in the control variables included. First, Model I, is 
a basic specification that includes only the dummy variable which represents the transitional 
time window (stage II) without control variables. Afterwards in Models II and III, control 
variables related to economic incentives, socioeconomic and climatic conditions are 
incorporated. The difference between model II and III is that the last excludes the variable 
Prices, with the intention to keep a greater number of observations in the panel12.  
Finally, in model IV an additional dummy variable (NFTP) is included. This variable takes 
value one after NFTP (provincial territorial planning) is in force in each province. This 
variable detects possible incremental impacts of the provincial institutional change, related to 
increased controls and law enforcement, on the number of fires in stage III.  
Figure 6. Zones 
 
Source: Authors elaboration 
                                                          
12 The exclusion of certain provinces results from the fact that they do not grow any of the crops included in the 
price index.  
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For each model, three estimates were performed according to the region considered, first a 
full sample which includes 22 provinces, and second a partition of the sample in two zones: 1) 
Crop Zone (CZ) and 2) the Rest of the Country (ROC) (see map in Figure 6). 
Splitting of the total sample in two separate zones allows us to evaluate if the proposed 
“anticipation effect” happened in all the country, or if it only took place in provinces where 
competition between agricultural production and native forest conservation is relevant. Zones 
were defined considering the relevance of crops in the agricultural production. We define a 
“Crop Zone” (CZ) that includes the main grain producer provinces: Chaco, Corrientes, 
Cordoba, Entre Rios, Formosa, Jujuy, Misiones, Salta, Santa Fe, San Luis, Santiago del 
Estero and Tucuman. The rest of the country includes the following provinces that are more 
oriented to a variety of agricultural products, other than grain crops: Catamarca, Chubut, La 
Pampa, La Rioja, Mendoza, Neuquén, San Juan, Santa Cruz, Rio Negro and Tierra del Fuego.  
Table 2 presents the mean values of the dependent and independent variables, by stage and 
Zone. Zone 1 represents provinces considered in the crop zone (CZ) and Zone 2 corresponds 
to the rest of the country (ROC). We can observe that, though in average there are no signs of 
relevant changes in climatic variables, there is a significant increase in the mean values of 
economic variables and, specially, in the number of fires in the CZ. But, we can remark that 
there is not an increase in the average number of forest fires in the rest of the country.  
Table 2. Mean values of variables by stage and zone  
 
Variable Stage I Stage II Stage III 
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 1 Zone 2 
FF 4,51 4,07 11,45 3,19 3,33 2,92 
Tempmax 29,72 29,85 30,60 30,43 31,04 29,72 
Temp80 95,27 92,03 104,07 100,50 98,45 84,87 
Precip 4,17 1,29 4,19 1,75 4,36 0,94 
Prices 480,95 473,49 923,27 767,61 1149,63 1240,00 
Stock  2659026 764444 3685390 535339 2049278 444181 
GDPgr 0,13 0,17 0,05 -0,02 0,07 0,09 
LEprosecuted 0,56 0,87 0,52 0,89 0,69 1,01 
LEconvicts 0,51 0,55 0,36 0,42 0,48 0,45 
UE 0,08 0,07 0,07 0,06 0,05 0,05 
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Table 3 presents the estimates of the basic model that includes only the NFAct dummy as 
explanatory variable. Estimates show that the coefficient associated to dummy variable 
NFAct is positive and statistically significant in the full sample and in the CZ estimation. This 
shows that during this specific time window, forest fires increased compared to previous and 
post stages. This result can be considered an evidence in favor for the hypothesis of a 
transitory increase of intentional fires, that were induced to avoid the restrictions imposed by 
NF Act after NFTP. In other words, there is some evidence of an “anticipation effect” during 
the time between year 2009 and the provincial law enactment. Our conjecture is that this 
effect could be motivated by the possibility of being able to affect the final NFTP. The forest 
arson increases the probability of excluding the burned forest from the regulation reach, and 
then use the land for agricultural production in the future. 
Table 3. Forest Fires -  Model I (Dependent variable: FF) 
Variable Full Sample Zone 1 Zone 2  
NF Act  2.559** 
(1.001) 
4.397** 
(1.768) 
.408 
(.581) 
Constant 3.914*** 
(.344) 
 4.226***   
(.607) 
3.523*** 
(.200) 
    
Observations 
Provinces  
286 
22 
156 
12 
130 
10 
Estimation Method Fixed Effects 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
As expected, in the main grain production area the estimated coefficient of the dummy 
variable NFAct, presents the higher positive value. On the other hand, it is not possible to 
confirm an adverse effect of NF Act during transition phase in the rest of the country. As no 
evidence was found about law impact in the rest of the country, further analysis concentrates 
in the full sample, and in the CZ results.  
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Table 4. Forest Fires - Models II and IV ((Dependent variable: FF) 
Variable Model II Model IV 
Full 
Sample 
Zone 1 Full 
Sample 
Zone 1 
NF Act  6.289** 
(2.800) 
7.056**    
(3.209) 
4.563** 
(2.204) 
6.475** 
(3.147) 
NFTP - -   -.550 
(1.770) 
-.524 
(2.603)  
Precip -.114 
(.096)  
-.682 
(.970) 
-.785 
(.577) 
 -.690 
(.860)  
TempMax  -.841 
(.819)  
.403 
(2.041) 
 -.276 
(.938) 
 -.524 
(2.603) 
Temp80  -.113 
(1.670)  
-.130 
(.109) 
 -.057 
(.062) 
 -.120   
(.103) 
GDPgr 5.974 
(9.329) 
6.860 
(10.654) 
 3.874 
(6.181) 
5.120 
(9.207) 
UE 29.762   
(64.285) 
50.048    
(74.817) 
19.935 
(39.443) 
53.801 
(60.660) 
Prices  -.904 
(2.874) 
-1.207 
(3.231) 
- - 
Stock 5.379 
(7.948) 
11.514  
(10.714) 
4.616 
(4.915) 
10.405  
(9.769) 
LEprosecuted -.329 
(1.988) 
-.986  
(2.339)  
.073 
(1.633) 
-.810 
(2.269) 
LEconvicts 2.211 
(7.059)  
1.768  
(8.245) 
 1.542 
(4.954) 
1.997 
(7.657) 
Constant  -52.553 
(146.7) 
 -152.850  
(191.811) 
-45.701 
(77.629) 
-141.906  
(170.828
) 
Observations 
Provinces  
105 
12 
90 
10 
150 
16 
99 
10 
Estimation Method Fixed Effects 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4 presents the results of models II and IV that include economic and weather control 
variables13. The full sample estimate for model II does not include the following provinces: 
Chubut, La Rioja, Mendoza, Neuquén, Rio Negro, Salta, San Juan, Santa Cruz, Santiago del 
Estero and Tierra del Fuego14, while estimates for agricultural Zone do not include Salta and 
Santiago del Estero. 
Model II estimates, show that the dummy variable NFAct is still positive and statistically 
significant. Model IV incorporates the dummy variable NFTP and excludes the control 
variable Prices15. In both estimates, the full sample of provinces and the CZ, the dummy 
variable NFTP which captures the impact of regulation enforcement at provincial level (stage 
III) does not show statistical significance. This would indicate that there is no evidence of 
impact on forest fires after the final law enforcement at a local level, as compared to previous 
periods16. 
The full sample coefficient estimates for the dummy variable NFAct in models II an IV, 
shows a quantitative effect of 6.3 and 4.6 additional fires during the stage II. If we consider 
that the average annual fires per 100.000 ha of forest land from 2002 to 2014 was 4.23 annual 
fires, we can conclude that there was a significant quantitative increase in the number of 
forest fires (some100% to 200%) during the transition phase. As expected, in the agricultural 
Zone, the quantitative effect is larger than the full sample, with coefficients in the order of 6.5 
to 7.0  
Figure 7 shows a simplified representation of the impact on the number of forest fires during 
transition period. During the stage II the number of forest fires increases, relative to the 
average in stages I and III. According to our estimates the cyclical pattern is similar, but 
different in magnitude, for all sample specifications: number of forest fires increases during 
the transition period and returns to the mean after the NFTP implementation by the provinces.  
                                                          
13 Model III is presented in Table A3 in the appendix. Results are very similar to model II. 
14 Exclusion is due to missing data or, in the case of variable Prices, due to the absence of agricultural crop 
production in some provinces.  
15 The sample excludes the following provinces: La Rioja, Salta, San Juan, Santa Cruz, Santiago del Estero and 
Tierra del Fuego. 
16 Estimates were performed also by pooled OLS and Random Effects. Results preserve sign, significance and 
similar magnitude.  
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Figure 7. The NF Act impact  
 
Source: Authors elaboration 
This impact can be related to an adjustment in individual behavior caused by the changes in 
the institutional environment: economic agents anticipates future deforesting restrictions and 
decide, by forest arson, to avoid regulations and clear land which can have potential 
agricultural use. Also, it is possible to associate these actions to an intent of affecting the 
NFTP process. Indeed, the objective of the forest arson could be the increase in the 
exclusion´s probability of the burned site from the two greater conservation categories (red 
and yellow) that limit the agricultural land use in the NF Act. Therefore, the forest arson 
could have an impact over the regulation process influencing the categories assigned by the 
NFTP. 
C. Robustness check: Difference-in-Differences Approach 
In previous estimates the effect caused by NF Act on forest fires was statistically significant 
in the agricultural Zone but not in the rest of the country. Since information for pre- and post-
intervention outcomes is available, in this section we use a difference-in-differences approach 
taking the area were the agricultural activity is not predominant as control group and the 
agricultural Zone as the treatment group. This approach assumes that NF Act enforcement has 
no impact in the rest of the country because restrictions established by the regulation are not 
operative in the provinces which belong to this Zone. To support this proposition, we note 
that: a) agricultural activities which had attractive prices during NF Act enforcement are not 
developed in these areas, b) land capacity differs from predominantly agricultural regions, 
they are generally arid and semiarid, and finally, c) the forest mass in this region is 
significantly smaller than forest mass in the Agricultural Region which includes Parque 
22 
 
Chaqueño, the Selva Tucumano Boliviana, the Selva Misionera and a great part of the 
Espinal.  
 The difference-in-differences methodology is widely used when treatment was not randomly 
assigned since the method allows to control for time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity. 
The difference-in-differences approach compares the trend in the outcome of interest for the 
treated group to the trend of the control group (i.e. the control group’s trend is used as 
a counterfactual).  
Formally, the difference-in-differences approach estimates the following regression model: 
       (14) 
where FFit is the outcome variable (number of forest fires per 100.000 ha
-1) of province i at 
time t, Tit is a dummy variable that is equal to one if province i is treated at time t and zero 
otherwise, i is the producer fixed effect, t is the time fixed effect common to all provinces, 
β is the parameter of interest, and it is the error term. The vectors of xjit and wkit are economic 
and weather control variables as in equation (13) 
The identification assumption of the difference-in-differences approach is that the trend of the 
control group is an unbiased estimator of the trend that the treated group would have followed 
had the intervention not taken place. The common trends assumption cannot be directly tested 
but, following Galiani et al. (2005), it is possible to test the similarity of the trends before the 
intervention.   
Table 5 reports the estimates of a variation of equation (14) using only pre-treatment periods 
that includes a linear trend and, instead of the treatment variable, an interaction between the 
linear trend and a dummy variable that is equal to one if the province is eventually treated 
(crop Zone) and zero otherwise. Finding a statistically non-significant estimate for the 
interaction term provides evidence in favor of the parallel trends assumption. As shown in 
Table 5, we cannot reject the that pre-treatment linear trends are the same for the eventually 
treated and control provinces, providing confidence on the difference-in-differences 
assumption. This test confirms the previous evidence for the group of provinces which 
integrate the rest of the country region there are no evidences of any effect caused by law 
enforcement on forest fires.  
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Table 5. Test of pre-treatment trends. (Dependent variable FF) 
Variables Coefficients 
Trend 0.51 
(0.82) 
Interaction term 0.064 
(0.69) 
Observations 67 
Provinces 12 
R2 0.11 
Notes: Control variables not reported: Precip, TempMax, Temp80, GDPgr, UE, Prices, Stock, LEprosecuted, 
LEconvicts.   Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Table 6 presents the main results of the difference-in-differences estimation. The treatment 
variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one during the years of stage II for each province 
in the crops Zone and zero otherwise. The economic and weather variables are included as 
controls in the estimation.  
The difference- in-difference coefficient estimate shows a positive impact of the NF Act on 
forest fires during the stage II. The treated provinces increased the number of forest fires 
during the implementation phase of the NF Act, and the magnitude of the impact (5.96), is 
close to the previous estimates presented in Table 3. These results indicate a robust effect on 
forest fires derived from the changes in the institutional environment and economic incentives 
after the NF Act enactment. 
Table 6. Difference-in-differences model. (Dependent variable: FF) 
Variables Coefficients 
Treatment 5.96** 
(2.69) 
Observations 116 
Provinces 12 
R2 0.08 
Notes: Control variables not reported: Precip, TempMax, Temp80, GDPgr, UE, Prices, Stock, LEprosecuted, 
LEconvicts.   Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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VII. Final Remarks 
This paper evaluates the impact of the implementation process of a new law that restricts the 
deforestation of native forests in Argentina. Our study has two main contributions. First, to 
the analysis of environmental regulation which can have unexpected negative impacts 
depending on the implementation strategy. Second, this paper contributes to the empirical 
literature on forest fires and the study of economic incentives for fire arson. 
We propose that the crime of forest arson can be an economic response to the limitations to 
deforest lands due to the new environmental regulations. We present a conceptual model 
based in the economic theory of crime to describe the changes in institutions and economic 
incentives due to the new regulations, and to predict individual behavior.  
We then present empirical evidence of systematic effects in the occurrence of forest fires in 
Argentine provinces as a function of the new regulation and its sequential implementation. 
We find more forest fires during a transition period, when the NF Act enforcement suspended 
deforestation of native forests until provincial NFTP enactment. (stage II). 
Once we control for the regional specialization, dividing the sample of provinces according to 
agricultural production, estimates show that the number of forest fires tends to be larger in 
crop specialized provinces; the number of fires during the transition phase (2009-2011 
approximately) in main crop producer provinces increases some 100%-200% relative to the 
national average. Using an alternative difference-in-differences approach, we confirm a 
significant increase in forest fires impact for the crop specialized provinces. This result 
reinforces the intuition of economic motivation behind the increase in the number of forest 
fires. 
Our results suggest a transitory negative impact of the regulation on the number of forest 
fires, opposite to the conservation goal stated in the law. The conceptual model and the 
empirical results suggests that this adverse effect was a consequence both, of the potential 
benefits of agricultural activities that can be performed in deforested lands, as well as of poor 
law enforcement which turns arson more attractive.  
We conjecture that there was also an important incentive due to the possibility of affecting the 
final setting of the native forest territorial planning during stage II. During the transition phase 
there was a low level of local law enforcement, high crop prices and a low economic 
compensation for forest preservation, practically not perceived by forest land owners. After 
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the implementation of the provincial territorial planning we can presume, first, that the new 
restrictions and higher provincial law enforcement incremented the costs of committing 
crimes and reduced the net benefits of arson activities. Second, that the possibility of 
endogenously modifying regulations to obtain greater future benefits was no longer possible, 
explaining why in stage III results show a reversal in the number of forest fires.  
Regarding institutions and NF Act enforcement, it can be noted that the law guidelines were 
designed mainly on a national level, with a poor participation of local stakeholders. Ostrom 
(1990, 2005) notes the importance of considering local conditions and agents’ characteristics 
to obtain sustainable agreements in natural resources management. The number of agents and 
heterogeneity of interests proved to be serious disadvantages during NF Act formulation and 
implementation. In general, private actors were not involved in the process, and the low 
consensus between agents was important as a factor contributing to generate unexpected 
negative effects, as the described increase in forest fires. Finally, the present study intends to 
provide evidence about the relationship of forest conservation laws and economic incentives 
than can be useful for policy design in the field of natural resources. 
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APPENDIX 
1. Decision tree Stage II. 
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A2. Definition of variables and data sources 
Variable Description Source  
Dependent variable  
Forest fires (FF) 
Number of annual fires in arbustal, native forest, implanting forest 
and pasture x 100,000ha-1 of forest lands per province. 
Estadísticas de incendios forestales. Dirección 
de Bosques-Secretaría de Ambiente y 
Desarrollo de la Nación. 
Explanatory 
variables  
 
NF Act Binary variable. Equal to 1 from year 2009 until the end of the NFTP 
in the i-th province, and zero otherwise 
Infoleg-Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos 
Humanos. 
NFTP Binary variable. Equal to 1 from the year that the i-th province enact 
the NFTP. 
Infoleg-Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos 
Humanos. 
Agricultural 
production (Prices) 
Index that weights crop prices (soybean, corn, wheat and sunflower) 
by cultivated area per province. (natural logarithm) 
Prices = price sunflower * share S + price soybean * share S + price 
corn * share C + price wheat * shareW. 
 
Series de precios agrícolas publicada por la 
Asociación Argentina de Consorcios 
Regionales de Experimentación Agrícola en 
base a datos disponibles en Dirección de 
Información Agrícola y Forestal-Minagri. 
Beef Cattle Stock 
(stock) 
Cattle stock, in number of heads (natural logarithm) 
Agorseries de CREA, en base al Sistema 
Integrado de Gestión de Sanidad Animal 
(SIGSA)-SENASA. 
Unemplyment (UE) Unemployment rate Encuesta Permanentes de Hogares continua 
(EPH-INDEC. 
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LE (Law Enforcment) Bumber of prosecuted LEprosecuted) per thousand inhabitants and 
number of convicts (LE_convicts) per thousand inhabitants per year 
in each province. 
Sistema Nacional de Estadística sobre 
Ejecución de la Pena-Dirección Nacional de 
Política Criminal 
Growth rate (GDPgr) Per capita Geographical Domestic Product annual growth rate by 
province 
Dirección Nacional de Coordinación Fiscal 
con las Provincias- Ministerio de Hacienda y 
Finanzas Públicas. 
Rainfall (Precip) Annual average rainfall in millimeters, measured in rainfall days. Sistema de Información y Gestión 
Agrometeorológico (SIGA) del Instituto 
Nacional de tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA) 
Temperature (Temp) • TempMax: annual maximum temperature per province. 
• Temp80_max: number of days in the year that exceed 80º 
Fahrenheit (26,66º C)  
Sistema de Información y Gestión 
Agrometeorológico (SIGA) del Instituto 
Nacional de tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA) 
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A3. Forest Fires - Model III (Dependent variable: FF) 
 
Variable Full Sample Zone 1 Zone 2 
Constant 49.357 
(76.454) 
-145.510 
(168.869) 
Number of 
observations 
insufficient to 
estimate the 
model. 
NF Act 
 4.800**  
(2.060) 
- 
NFTP 
- 6.681**    
(2.958) 
Precip 
 -.807 
(.572) 
-.718 
(.843) 
TempMax 
-.326 
(.920) 
.187 
(1.774) 
Temp80 
-.058 
(.061) 
-.122 
(.102) 
GDPgr 
3.849 
(6.158) 
5.251 
(9.128)  
UE 
26.983 
(32.145)  
60.695 
(49.802) 
Stock 
-.802 
(.572) 
10.775 
(9.538)  
LEprosecuted 
-.056 
(1.573) 
-.928 
(2.179) 
LEconvicts 
1.370 
(4.905) 
2.052 
(7.606) 
Observations. / 
Provinces  
150/ 
16 
99/ 
10 
Estimation methods Fixed Effect 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
